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CASE COMMENTARY
Human Dignity and Economic Integrity for Persons
with Disabilities: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's
Decisions in Granovsky and Martin
ENA CHADHA* AND LAURA SCHATZ -"
RtSUM
Dans cet article, les auteurs examinent, A travers une loupe du module d'invalidit6
6conomique, deux r~centes dcisions prononces par la Cour supreme du Canada
relatives la section 15 de la Charte. Les auteurs soutiennent que le modle d'invalidit6
6conomique est fond sur un st~r~otype qui pr~sente d~pendance, charit6 et pauvret6
comme des normes des personnes handicap~es. Cons~quemment, ce modle contri-
bue perp~tuer les in~galit~s 6conomiques qui psent sur les personnes handicap~es.
Il est malheureux que ces stereotypes n~gatifs continuent exercer une influence sur
la jurisprudence de la Charte. Les auteurs commencent par expliquer comment le
modle 6conomique est un concept th~orique d'invalidit6; puis, ils donnent un aperqu
de comment la m~thodologie de la section 15 utilis~e dans le cas Law - tout sp~ciale-
ment 1'< analyse essentielle de la dignit6 humaine > - contribue A perp~tuer le modle
6conomique. Les auteurs analysent ensuite l'application et l'impacte du cas Law dans
deux causes importantes de discrimination fond~e sur l'invalidit6 : Martin et Grano-
vsky. Bien que, d'une part, Granovsky pr~sente une interpretation 6volutive de l'inva-
lidit6 et que de 'autre, Martin contribue A faire avancer les droits des personnes
handicap~es garanties sous la Charte, les auteurs sont d'avis que les deux causes sont
des exemples typiques de comment le test de la « dignit6 humaine essentielle > contient
en soi un entendement economique de l'invalidit6 et, partant, perp~tue l'in~galit6
6conomique des personnes handicap~es. Les auteurs tirent la conclusion qu'il reste
encore beaucoup A faire pour que l'int~grit6 6conomique des personnes handicapes
soit reconnue comme un 616ment de la dignit6 humaine et du droit A I'6galit6. L'article
appelle A une meilleure comprehension des in~galit~s 6conomiques insidieuses que
vivent les personnes handicap~es.
* Ena Chadha is Director of Litigation with A Legal Resource Centre for Persons with Disabilities
(ARCH) and an LLM candidate with Osgoode Hall Law School. **Laura Schatz was formerly a
staff lawyer with ARCH and currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Waterloo. This
paper was developed from an earlier presentation by Ms. Chadha at the National Association of
Women and the Law Biennial Conference in Ottawa on 7 March 2002. The authors are grateful
for the helpful feedback from Debra M. McAllister. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Over 20 years ago, disability activists vigorously advocated for the inclusion of mental
and physical disability as protected grounds of discrimination in section 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.i They believed that, by constitutionally
guaranteeing a right to equality for persons with disabilities, the Charter could be used
to radically and positively transform Canadian society for persons with disabilities.
2
Now, more than 20 years later, disability advocates have reason to question these early
assumptions about the effectiveness of Charter challenges in disability cases because
of the intensifying hold of the "essential human dignity" test in equality rights
jurisprudence.
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered an important decision on the
interpretation of the equality rights guarantee in section 15(1) of the Charter.3 In Law
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the Supreme Court unani-
mously adopted a three-pronged test for determining whether the section 15(1) right
to equality has been infringed. 4 Integral to this test is an evaluation of whether the
alleged discriminatory treatment was detrimental to the claimant's "essential human
dignity". The following year, the Supreme Court applied this new Law test in a
disability case: Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).
5
Regrettably, in Granovsky, the Supreme Court arrived at a restrictive interpretation of
"essential human dignity" with respect to persons with disabilities, which hinged, in
part, on an "economic model" of understanding disability. While there was hope that
an expansive and more progressive interpretation of human dignity for persons with
disabilities would be offered in the recently decided Martin6 case, that judgment
reveals that the Supreme Court remains under the influence of the "essential human
dignity" paradigm. Although the final outcome of the Martin decision was favourable
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2. D. Lepofsky, "A Report Card on the Charter's Guarantee of Equality to Persons with Disabilities
after 10 Years: What Progress? What Prospects?" (1998) 7 N.J.C.L. 263.
3. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides as follows: "Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on ... mental or physical disability."
4. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 11999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Law]. The Law
decision, discussed below, involved a section 15 Charter challenge to the survivor benefits provi-
sion of the Canada Pension Plan on the basis of age.
5. Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 [Gra-
novskyl. The Granovsky decision, discussed in below, involved a section 15 Charter challenge to
the disability benefits provision of the Canada Pension Plan on the basis of disability.
6. Workers' Compensation Board of Nova Scotia v. Martin et al., [20031 2 S.C.R. 504 [Martin]. The
Martin decision, discussed below, involved a section 15 Charter challenge to provincial workers'
compensation legislation on the basis of disability.
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for persons with disabilities, few real changes were made to the "essential human
dignity" analysis and its reliance on an economic understanding of disability.
Given that the Supreme Court of Canada continues to endorse a circumscribed view
of human dignity for persons with disabilities, advocates are left to question the utility
of pursuing Charter challenges in disability cases. This paper begins by explaining the
"economic model" as a theoretical conception of disability. The paper then outlines
the section 15 methodology advanced in the Law decision and examines how the new
"essential human dignity" criterion is used by the Supreme Court in assessing whether
discrimination has occurred. The paper goes on to analyze the application and impact
of the Law framework, in particular the problematic "essential human dignity" analy-
sis, in two important disability discrimination cases: Granovsky and Martin. The paper
argues that the Granovsky and Martin decisions are clear examples of how the "essen-
tial human dignity" test, as reflected in this current Charter jurisprudence, embodies
an economic understanding of disability and hence perpetuates the economic inequal-
ity of persons with disabilities. The paper urges that greater attention must be accorded
to protecting the economic integrity of persons with disabilities in equality rights
litigation.
MODELS OF DISABILITY
The emergence of the disability rights movement in the latter half of the twentieth
century generated significant discussion about the various ways in which disability
and disablement have been conceptualized and understood throughout history. Con-
tributing to this critical disability scholarship in Canada is the work of leading
disability theorist Jerome E. Bickenbach. In his authoritative text Physical Disability
and Social Policy, Bickenbach identified three perspectives of disability that operate in,
and can be used to analyze, Canadian social policy: biomedical, economic, and
socio-political. 7
While complex and interrelated, these three theoretical frameworks of disability are
largely explained and understood by their labels. The biomedical model of disability
is premised on the historical and outdated view that a disability is a physiological or
psychological deficiency or dysfunction that must be cured. Similarly, in the economic
model of disability (described below), the disabled are not only viewed as abnormal
because they live with an impairment, but their value is further discounted because
they are perceived as incapable of contributing to the labour market and pose a
financial burden on society. In contrast, the socio-political model, considered to be
the more progressive and human-rights positive theory, examines disability through
the social, political, physical, and cultural arrangements created by society that give
rise to barriers. The socio-political model shifts the focus of the problem from the
7. Jerome E. Bickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1993).
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individual's impairment and, instead, posits that the true disadvantage is the deeply
entrenched systemic discrimination that exists in society.
Operating in tandem, the biomedical and economic models of disablement view
persons with disabilities as defective, look to medical treatments for solutions, under-
estimate the ability of persons with disabilities to participate in the labour market
while inflating the costs of disability-related accommodation, and tend to have a
"charity or needs-based normative"*8 Alternatively, the socio-political model seeks to
challenge the discriminatory systems and structures present in the surrounding social
and political environment. Unfortunately, as will be argued in this paper, recent
equality-rights jurisprudence in Canada continues to be rooted in the prejudicial
economic notions of disability.
Economic Model of Disability
The economic construction of disability has been explained most cogently in the works
of Michael Oliver, a prominent disability-rights scholar from Britain. 9 In this model,
disability is framed as a product of liberal economic ideology, which normalizes wealth
maximization and individualism. 10 Oliver holds that the oppression experienced by
persons with disabilities is rooted in the economic and social structures of capitalism.
The focus for this model is on the individual's repertoire of productive skills and
capacities to collect capital through an economic process. ' Oliver contends that the
systemic exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream world of work is
caused by their identity as "non-productive" members, an underclass of society that
is marginalized, isolated, and devalued as a liability on the state and taxpayers.
Adopting Oliver's thesis, this paper argues that Canadian society espouses an eco-
nomic concept of personhood, which is premised on the importance of maximizing
8. Ibid. at 92.
9. Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1990). Oliver explains that "[tihe economy, through both the operation of the labour
market and the social organisation of work, plays a key role in producing the category of
disability and in determining societal responses to disabled people." Along with Oliver and
Bickenbach, other authors have commented on the powerful influence of the economic model
of disability. See, for example, Marta Russell and Ravi Malhotra, who "take the view that disabil-
ity is a socially-created category derived from labour relations, a product of the exploitative
economic structure of capitalist society: one which creates (and then oppresses) the so-called
'dis-abled' body as one of the conditions that allow the capitalist class to accumulate wealth."
"The Political Economy of Disablement: Advances and Contradictions" in Leo Panitch & Colin
Leys, eds., 2002: A World of Contradictions, online: <http://www.yorku.ca/socreg/RusMal.htm>.
10. In this article, the expression "liberal economic theory" is used to refer to an ideology espousing
diminished state regulation, laissez-faire capitalism, accelerated industrialism, and competition.
Facilitating the autonomy of private actors and maximizing labour and capital are considered
dominant goals in this ideology.
11. Supra note 7 at 101.
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capital and insists on a robust level of participation in the labour market. Our identity
is defined by our role in the economy, which values production and wealth, and in so
doing creates the social category of disabled persons in response to economic and
social forces of capitalism. The liberal economic perspective holds as fundamental and
ideal the qualities of productivity, competitiveness, and profitability. Under this theory
of efficient allocation of resources to promote the accumulation of capital, the corn-
modification of individuals is based on their relationship to the labour market and the
economy. Consequently, a person's inability to compete in the collection of capital
defines that person as inefficient and an economic reject.
In the economic model, an individual with a disability is seen as a person who
embodies a cost and, thus, poses an economic liability on the state. Since this cost must
be factored into society-wide public policy decisions on resource allocation, disability
becomes a socially created category of dependency. 12 In the liberal economic ideal of
a society composed of private, autonomous actors, such public dependency is a
negative trait, and reliance on state assistance is reserved for those seen as most
helpless. 13 As such, a pervasive stereotype operating in the economic model of disabil-
ity is that only those with profound and severe impairments deserve the benevolence
of state support, or, in other words, are the "truly needy".' 4 Only those persons who
are so disabled that they are unable to participate in the liberal, free-market economy
are entitled to public assistance. Thus, the emphasis is on community pity and charity
operates as a normative response to disability under the economic model of disability.
The economic model interprets charity as a corollary of disability, which, in turn, gives
rise to a convergence between eligibility for state assistance and severity of disability.
Under this theory, government expenditures and disablement policy can properly be
directed only at providing social security and support programs for those who are
severely disabled.15
One Canadian scholar, writing about legal rights for persons with disabilities, notes
that the economic model of disability underlies all of our major programs for persons
with disabilities, including workers' compensation, social security, and vocational
rehabilitation. Ian McKenna describes these programs as "pillars of contemporary
Canadian disablement policy" and further notes that such programs "focus on the
economic efficiency of assisting persons with impairments and disabilities to make the
12. Supra note 7 at 13, see also 93-134.
13. For a recent examination of the issue of negative attitudes towards disability and dependency,
see F. Samson, "Globalization and Inequality of Women with Disabilities" (2003) 2 J.L. &
Equality 16 at 27. In her article, Sampson explores the disadvantage experienced by persons with
disabilities, especially women, in a society that "blames individuals who live in a state of eco-
nomic dependency rather than understanding the condition as a result of systemic dysfunc-
tions" of a mainstream society built on ablest assumptions of normalcy.
14. Supra note 7 at 94.
15. Supra note 7; I. McKenna, "Legal Rights for Persons with Disabilities in Canada: Can the
Impasse Be Resolved?" (1997-1998) 29 Ottawa L. Rev. 153.
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adjustments necessary to allow them to participate in the labour force." 16 The thesis
of this paper is that in order to qualify for these types of income support programs,
the disabled individual must prove that he or she is severely or profoundly disabled,
compared to the able-bodied claimants who access parallel income support pro-
grams. 17 Essentially, liberal economic theory imposes an "all or nothing" standard of
eligibility for persons with disabilities under these programs: the individual must be
perceived to be entirely disabled to receive state support. As a result, judicial treatment
of these programs is implicitly grounded in an economic model of disability and
therefore perpetuates the long-standing belief that in order to receive some form of
state assistance, persons with disabilities must be totally and seriously disabled. This
position, in turn, reinforces the prevailing myth that persons with disabilities are not
valuable contributors to society.
The persistent operation of such pejorative stereotypes regarding persons with dis-
abilities in Canadian society was recognized by the Supreme Court in Eldridge v. British
Columbia (Attorney General).'8 In Eldridge, the claimants, who were deaf, asserted that
their section 15 Charter rights were violated because they were denied sign language
interpretation when seeking access to hospital services. The Supreme Court held that
the failure to provide sign language interpretation when it is needed for effective
communication in the delivery of health care services violated the section 15 rights of
deaf persons and ordered the British Columbia government to pay for sign language
interpreters to ensure equal treatment for deaf patients in health care services. The
Eldridge judgment is considered a leading case for advancing substantive equality and
affirming state responsibility to provide services to accommodate disability-related
needs under section 15 of the Charter.19 LaForest, writing for the Court in this seminal
equality rights decision noted,
16. McKenna, supra note 14.
17. For example, to receive a retirement pension under the Canada Pension Plan [CPPI after the age
of 60 and prior to age 65 (the latter being the age when a retirement pension normally starts),
the claimant must simply stop working or earn less than the current monthly maximum CPP
retirement pension payment ($814.17 in 2004). In contrast, to receive a disability pension under
the CPP, an individual must prove that he or she lives with a physical or mental disability that is
severe and prolonged (lasting at least one year or likely to result in death) and renders an
individual incapable of regularly pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. See Canada
Pension Plan General Information, Social Development Canada, online: <http://www.sdc.gc.cal
en/gateways/topics/cpr-gxr.shtml>. Similarly, to be eligible for social assistance under the On-
tario Disability Support Program, the claimant must have a substantial physical or mental
impairment that is continuous or recurrent for at least one year that results in a substantial
restriction of the person's ability to attend to his or her own care or function in the community
or in the workplace.
18. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [19971 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge].
19. A number of scholars have commented upon the importance of the Eldridge decision, including
D. Pothier, "Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General): How the Deaf Were Heard in the
Supreme Court of Canada" (1998) 9 N.J.C.L. 263; J. Keene, "Claiming the Protection of the
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Persons with disabilities have too often been excluded from the labour force, denied
access to opportunities for social interaction and advancement, subjected to invidi-
ous stereotyping and relegated to institutions.... This historical disadvantage has to
a great extent been shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is an abnor-
mality or flaw. As a result, disabled persons have not generally been afforded the
"equal concern, respect and consideration" that s. 15(1) of the Charter demands.
Instead, they have been subjected to paternalistic attitudes of pity and charity, and
their entrance into the social mainstream has been conditional upon their emula-
tion of able-bodied norms.... One consequence of these attitudes is the persistent
social and economic disadvantage faced by the disabled, described by statistical
information to be that persons with disabilities, in comparison to non-disabled
persons, have less education, are more likely to be outside the labour force, face
much higher unemployment rates, and are concentrated at the lower end of the pay
scale while employed.
20
Two years after rendering the groundbreaking Eldridge judgment, the Supreme Court
released its decision in Law, wherein the Court introduced the requirement of proof
of harm to a claimant's "essential human dignity" as a necessary component of a
successful section 15 challenge. Unfortunately, the disturbing stereotypes recognized
by the Court in Eldridge have since made their way into the "essential human dignity"
analysis propounded in Law, and now appear to firmly entrench an "economic model"
of disability in equality rights jurisprudence.
THE NEW SECTION 15 FRAMEWORK
Summary of the Law Decision
On 25 March 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a unanimous decision in
Law v. Canada,2 1 sending equality rights jurisprudence down the turbulent path of
"essential human dignity" The Law case involved a section 15 Charter challenge to the
age restrictions contained in the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) for payment of survivor
benefits. The claimant, Nancy Law, was a 30-year-old widow who, due to the fact that
she was childless and under the age 45 at the time of her spouse's death, was not eligible
for survivor benefits. Under the CPP, surviving spouses between the ages of 35 and 45
received benefits on a reduced scale, and specifically those under the age of 35 who are
Court: Charter Litigation Arising from Government "Restraint"' (1998) 9 N.J.C.L. 97; B. Porter,
"Beyond Andrews: Substantive Equality and Positive Obligations after Eldridge and Vriend"
(1998) 9 Const. Forum Const. 71. In a recent article about disability theory and human rights,
Rioux and Valentine comment that the Eldridge decision "[r]ecognizes the status of people with
disabilities to receive what others receive as a claim not as government largesse. They are not in
the role of supplicants nor are the benefits they receive entitlements based on charitable privi-
lege" In M. H. Rioux and F. Valentine, "Does Theory Matter? Exploring the Nexus between
Disability, Human Rights and Public Policy" in R. Devlin & D. Pothier, eds., Critical Disability
Theory: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) at 15.
20. Supra note 17 at para. 56.
21. Law v. Canada, supra note 4, J. lacobucci for the Supreme Court.
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able-bodied and without dependent children were entirely precluded from receiving
survivor benefits until attaining the age of 65.22
Nancy Law alleged that these distinctions discriminated against her on the basis of age
and violated her right to equality, contrary to section 15 of the Charter. However, the
Supreme Court held that the group with which Nancy Law identified herself as a
member - namely adults under the age of 45 - were not consistently and routinely
subjected to discrimination and, as such, it was difficult for the Court to conclude that
the impugned legislative distinctions violated her essential human dignity. In rejecting
Nancy Law's claim, the Supreme Court formulated a new methodology for determin-
ing whether discrimination had occurred by introducing the criterion of "essential
human dignity" as a central consideration in the section 15 analysis.
Law Introduces Essential Human Dignity
The Law decision sets out the Supreme Court of Canada's current approach for
analyzing an alleged equality rights violation under section 15 of the Charter. While
reaffirming a commitment to the notion of substantive equality, this judgment signifi-
cantly complicated the Court's earlier and more straightforward approach to section
15 by inserting an additional step of demonstrating injury to the claimant's human
dignity as a critical ingredient to proving an equality rights violation.
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,23 the previous leading section 15 case,
24
the Supreme Court posed two questions in determining whether section 15 was
infringed: (1) was there differential treatment based on a protected or analogous
ground of discrimination, and (2) was a consequence or effect of the differential
treatment to impose a burden or withhold a benefit compared to others?25 Andrews
22. The claimant can receive benefits before the age of 65 if the claimant remarries and is re-wid-
owed, or if the claimant applies for early retirement or is disabled.
23. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [ 19891 1 S.C.R. 143 [Andrews]. Andrews was the first
equality rights challenge decided by the Supreme Court. The claimant in Andrews alleged that
his section 15 rights were violated by the mandatory citizenship status required for licensing
under the Barrister and Solicitors Act in British Columbia.
24. It is important to note that, up until the Law decision, there was great division within the
Supreme Court on the correct interpretative approach to section 15. The Andrews case was the
core decision of a trilogy (the other two cases being Reference re Workers' Compensation Act,
1983 (Newfoundland), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922, and R. v. Turpin, [19891 1 S.C.R. 1296) that pro-
vided the first point of consensus on section 15 interpretation prior to Law. However, that
consensus ultimately failed six years later with the 1995 trilogy of Egan v. Canada, [19951 2
S.C.R. 513; Miron v. Trudel, [19951 2 S.C.R 418; and Thibaudeau v. R., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.
These cases resulted in three different judicial interpretations of the correct approach to dis-
crimination, and no single interpretation was agreed upon by a majority of the Supreme Court.
After over a decade of disagreement, the Law decision facilitated a consensus on the proper
approach to section 15 among the Court by offering a synthesized version of the various section
15 tests.
25. Andrews, supra note 22 at 175, 182, and 183.
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emphasized the importance of examining the impact and the effect of the impugned
law or practice so as to fully comprehend the nature and scope of the discrimination
to ensure that substantive equality is achieved.
In developing a new test for assessing whether an impugned law or practice constituted
discrimination, the Supreme Court in Law focused on interpreting the purpose of the
right to equality as guaranteed in section 15. It was here, within the purpose of section
15, that the Court traced the criterion of "essential human dignity" as the core feature
of the right to equality and identified the fundamental purpose of section 15 as the
promotion of "essential human dignity":
It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping,
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society,
equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.... Al-
ternatively, differential treatment will not likely constitute discrimination within the
purpose of s. 15(1) where it does not violate the human dignity or freedom of a
person or group in this way, and in particular where the differential treatment also
assists in ameliorating the position of the disadvantaged within Canadian society.
26
While recognizing that no single word or phrase could capture the content and
purpose of section 15, the Court nevertheless fixed the focus of the Charter right to
equality on the notion of "essential human dignity". The Court elaborated on its
understanding of the concept of human dignity as it operates within section 15 as
follows:
What is human dignity? There can be different conceptions of what human dignity
means.... Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and
self-worth. It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empower-
ment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits
or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is
enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different
individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. Human
dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or deval-
ued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups
within Canadian society. Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guaran-
tee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but
rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted
with a particular law.
27
Based on this articulation of the objective of section 15, the Supreme Court reasoned
that, in order to properly decide an equality rights claim, there must be an inquiry to
assess whether the differential treatment constitutes discrimination in the "substantive
sense". In order to determine whether there is substantive discrimination, Justice
26. Law v. Canada, supra note 4, at para. 51.
27. Ibid. at para. 53.
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lacobucci, for the unanimous Court, conceived a new test for section 15, which focused
on the following three key issues:
(1) whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others in
purpose or effect by drawing a formal distinction or failing to take into account
the claimant's already disadvantaged position within society;
(2) whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination are the
basis for the differential treatment; and
(3) whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory within
the meaning of the equality guarantee.
28
In explaining this third requirement, Justice Jacobucci proposed four "contextual
factors" that would help ascertain whether the challenged governmental law or prac-
tice implicated the claimant's human dignity and thereby engaged section 15:
(1) whether there is any pre-existing disadvantage experienced by the claimant group;
(2) whether the impugned law takes into account the actual needs, capacity, or
circumstances of the claimant group;
(3) whether the law has any ameliorative purpose; and
(4) what the interests are that are affected.
29
While the Court in Law indicated that these four contextual factors were not an
exhaustive list of potential considerations, the Court noted that such factors would
serve to support an objective assessment of whether the claimant's human dignity was
demeaned. The Court stressed that, in considering these four contextual factors,
human dignity should always serve as the "point of reference" for evaluating the effect
of the impugned law:
The questions, to take up the dignity-related concerns discussed above, may be put
in the following terms. Do the impugned CPP provisions, in purpose or effect,
violate essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvan-
tage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice? Does the law, in purpose or effect,
conform to a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition as human beings
or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of con-
cern, respect, and consideration?30
Having defined the fundamental purpose of section 15 as the promotion of "essential
human dignity", the Court concluded that, in order for there to be a finding of
discrimination, a conflict must exist between the purpose or effect of an impugned
law and this human dignity objective of section 15. 31 This conflict must also have a
deleterious impact on the claimant's "essential human dignity" before it can be found
28. Ibid. at para. 53.
29. Ibid. at para. 62-80.
30. Ibid. at para. 99.
31. Ibid. at paras. 41.
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to constitute an infringement of the right to equality. Consequently, under the new
Law methodology, a claimant will not be able to satisfy a court that he or she has been
discriminated against unless it can be shown that his or her "essential human dignity"
has been seriously harmed or offended by the challenged law.
The Supreme Court of Canada asserted that this new three-prong, human dignity
focused section 15 analysis was preferable to the previous Andrews-type test because
this framework offered "a purposive and contextual approach to discrimination
analysis... to permit the realization of the strong remedial purpose of the equality
guarantee." 32 However, belying the Supreme Court's optimism, many human rights
advocates and legal academics observe significant negative implications from this new
labyrinth formulation of section 15. 3 3 The chief complaint of critics is that the
guidelines lack sufficient clarity and are too convoluted to work as a template for
enduring constitutional analysis. One scholar has summed up the criticism against the
"essential human dignity" criteria as follows: "Dignity is said to be vague to the point
of vacuous and, therefore, too easily usable to dress up decisions based on nothing
more than conservative gut reaction or excessive deference to Parliament."
34
Bolstering the concern that this new section 15 test is too malleable are the number of
section 15 challenges, released subsequent to Law, from various levels of court, that
have failed, and many conspicuously defeated under the third branch of the Law
guidelines as lacking the requisite degree of harm to human dignity.35 A recent
32. Ibid. at para. 88.
33. See, for instance, D. M. McAllister, "Section 15: The Unpredictability of the Law Test" (2003)
15.1 N.J.C.L. 35; B.J. Cameron, "A Work in Progress: The Supreme Court and the Charter's
Equation of Rights and Limits" in Debra McAllister & Adam Dodek, eds. The Charter at Twenty:
Law and Practice 2002 (Toronto: OBA, 2003); J. Keene, "The Law Decision-A Misstep in the
Quest to Define Discrimination" in McAllister & Dodek, eds., The Charter at Twenty: Law and
Practice 2002 (Toronto: OBA, 2003); E. Mendes, "Taking Equality into the 21st Century: Estab-
lishing the Concept of Equal Human Dignity" (2000) 12 N.J.C.L. 3; B. Baines, "Law v. Canada:
Formatting Equality" (2000) 11 Const. Forum Const. 65; S. Martin, "Balancing Individual
Rights to Equality and Social Goals" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299; J. Ross, "A Flawed Synthesis
of the Law" (2000) 11 Const. Forum Const. 74; C.D. Bredt & 1. Nishisato, "The Supreme
Court's New Equality Test: A Critique" (2000) 8 Canadian Watch 16; Peter W. Hogg, Constitu-
tional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 1997) at 1007-1015. Offering a
different perspective on Law, see D. Greschner, "Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?"
(2001) 27 Queen's L.J. 299.
34. D.G. Reaume, "Discrimination and Dignity" [2003] 63 La. L. Rev. at 2.
35. Notably, of course, Granovsky. See also, for instance, Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychi-
atric Institute), [ 19991 2 S.C.R. 625; Lovelace v. Ontario, [20001 1 S.C.R. 950; Nova Scotia (Attor-
ney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4
S.C.R. 429. While not solely decided on section 15, see Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney
General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, and most recently, Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and
the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, where again the Supreme Court found that the claimants
failed to pass through the third branch of the Law test and prove to the Court that their human
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statistical analysis of all section 15 decisions rendered by the Supreme Court since the
Law decision confirms this worrisome trend in finding that "the human dignity stage
of the Law analysis has posed a formidable barrier to equality claimants, accounting
for the dismissal of the claim in almost two thirds (7/11) of the unsuccessful s. 15 cases
in the past five years." 36 As discussed below, both Granovsky and Martin reflect this
worrisome trend: Granovsky in its finding that economic inequality does not offend
human dignity, and Martin in its reinforcement of the problematic third branch of the
Law test.
THE GRANVOSKY DECISION
While the Supreme Court may have heralded the new human dignity approach as
embracing a contextual and purposive spirit, human rights practitioners are of the
view that the Granovsky decision reveals the risks and difficulties of proceeding with
such a subjective analysis in equality rights cases. 37 In Granovsky, the first disability-
related decision since the new section 15 approach, the Supreme Court unanimously
ruled that the claimant's Charter challenge failed because it did not satisfy the "essen-
tial human dignity" threshold.38
Summary of Granovsky
39
The Granovsky case challenged the constitutional validity of the Canada Pension Plan
[CPPJ. The CPP plan is a compulsory, contributory, earnings-based social insurance
program that provides income benefits in the case of retirement, disability, or death. 4°
In order to qualify for CPP disability benefits, in addition to demonstrating that he or
she is severely and permanently disabled, a claimant must have paid sufficient earnings
contributions (known as minimum contributions) into the plan for a minimum
period of time (known as the recency test). 4 1
dignity had been offended in the manner contemplated by section 15. Most interesting is the
Lavoie v. Canada, [20021 1 S.C.R. 769 case where a clear rift appears within the Court on what
constitutes harm to human dignity.
36. B. Ryder, C. Faria, and E. Lawrence, "What's Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of Charter
Equality Rights Decisions" (2004) 24:2 SCLR 103. While Ryder concludes that the success rate of
section 15 claims at the Supreme Court has been greater under Law than Andrews, he finds the
success rate is still low (31.2%), and, moreover, of the cases that do fail, most (63.6%) fail at the
human dignity stage of the Law test.
37. A. Sabharwal, "Persons with Disabilities Face Inequality under CPP" 17:1 ARCH Type (winter
2000) online: ARCH <http://www.archlegalclinic.ca/publications/archType/2O00/vol I 7_nol/index.
asp>.
38. Justice Binnie authored the Granovsky judgment for Supreme Court.
39. We note that ARCH served as part of the legal team representing the Interveners, Council of
Canadians with Disabilities, who supported Mr. Granovsky's claim.
40. This explanation relies upon the information available on the Social Development Canada's
website, which provides a general description of the CPP program, online: <http://www.sdc.
gc.ca/asp/gateway.asp?hr=/en/isp/cpp/cppinfo.sht ml&hs=cpr>.
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Following a work-related accident in 1980, Mr. Granovsky was diagnosed with a
degenerative back condition and was assessed by workers' compensation as "tempo-
rarily totally disabled". At the time of the accident, Mr. Granovsky had made CPP
contributions for six of the ten previous years. However, following the accident, Mr.
Granovsky was employed only intermittently as a result of his deteriorating back
condition, and consequently made limited CPP contributions payments. In 1993, Mr.
Granovsky applied for a CPP disability pension as he was no longer able to work
because of his back condition. Mr. Granovsky's CPP application was denied because
he had paid only the minimum amount of contributions in one year of the relevant
CPP ten-year contribution period. 42 Furthermore, Mr. Granovsky did not qualify for
the "dropout" provision (available to claimants with severe and permanent disabili-
ties) under which periods of permanent disability causing absence from employment
are not counted in the contribution calculation.
43
Mr. Granovsky appealed, claiming that his right to equality was violated because, as a
person with a "temporary" disability, he worked irregularly as a result of the episodic
nature of his condition, and therefore was unable to regularly pay into the plan as
compared to able-bodied persons. Mr. Granovsky alleged that the CPP discriminated
against him by insisting on the same rules of recent contribution imposed on more
able-bodied workers, which he could not satisfy because of his temporary disability,
and further denying him the equivalent "dropout" privileges allowed to the perma-
nently disabled. 44 The Pensions Appeal Board and the Federal Court of Appeal refused
Mr. Granovsky's application. He was similarly unsuccessful in his Charter argument
41. Currently, to be eligible for a CPP disability benefit, the claimant must have paid sufficient CPP
contributions of at least $3,900 in income (for 2004) in at least four of the last six years worked.
The claimant must also prove a "severe" and "prolonged" disability, that being a condition that
is long, continued, and of indefinite duration that prevents the claimant from regularly pursuing
any substantially gainful occupation.
42. Granovsky v. Canada, supra note 5 at para. 10. The claimant had to establish that he had paid the
set minimum amount of contributions for the minimum qualifying period, specifically at the
time of Mr. Granovsky's CPP application, five of the last ten years or two of the last three years.
The Court referred to this standard as the "recency of contributions" test, which the Court
indicated was based upon the rationale that the CPP presupposes that in order to receive
pension benefits the claimant must prove a recent attachment to a workplace.
43. The "dropout" provisions allow certain claimants (a parent with child-rearing responsibilities or
a person with severe and permanent disability) to exempt periods of low earnings from the
contributory calculations. Mr. Granovsky was not entitled to the "dropout" exceptions because
he was neither a parent, who was out of the workforce as a result of child-rearing responsibili-
ties, nor permanently and severely disabled when he experienced his period of low earnings.
44. Granovsky v. Canada, supra note 5 at para. 8. Mr. Granovsky alleged that the CPP formula failed
to take into account the fact that persons with temporary disabilities may not be able to satisfy
the minimum years plus minimum contributions formula because the unstable nature of the
disability causes irregular or fractured work histories. Mr. Granovsky claimed that, as is the case
for persons with permanent disabilities, the CPP contribution formula should not include the
time that he was unable to work as a result of his degenerative back disability.
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before the Supreme Court of Canada. While the Supreme Court accepted that the
concept of "temporary disability" came within the purview of section 15, 45 the Court
rejected the proposition that the disadvantage experienced by Mr. Granovsky in being
denied a disability pension was tantamount to discrimination, contrary to section 15
of the Charter.
With respect to the first branch of the Law inquiry, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the CPP program did, in fact, differentiate amongst claimants based on "tempo-
rary" disability. However, with regards to the second branch, the Supreme Court
rejected the "able-bodied" as the proper comparator group, despite the fact the Court
had previously stated that a Charter claimant's identification of a comparator group
should be respected. 46 The Court held that, rather than being compared to able-bodied
CPP claimants (the group selected by Mr. Granovsky), Mr. Granovsky should be
compared to the category of permanently disabled CPP claimants, who received
disability benefits pursuant to a reduced standard of contributions.
Turning to the third branch of the Law framework, the Supreme Court concluded that
Mr. Granovsky failed to clear the "essential human dignity" hurdle. The Court rea-
soned that Mr. Granovsky did not successfully demonstrate, when compared to the
more severely disabled CPP claimant, that the statutory distinctions caused harm to
his human dignity:
While I have every sympathy for the appellant's injured back and the problematic
employment history to which it may have contributed, I do not believe that a rea-
sonably objective person, standing in his shoes and taking into account the context
of the CPP and its method of financing through contributions, would consider that
the greater allowance made for persons with greater disabilities in terms of CPP
contributions "marginalized" or "stigmatized" him or demeaned his sense of worth
and dignity as a human being.
47
Thus, although the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that Mr. Granovsky was
treated differently because of his disability and that he had suffered "the deprivation
of a financial benefit", the Court nevertheless held that the deprivation of a financial
benefit was not compelling enough to constitute discrimination under the Charter.48
The Court was not satisfied that the loss of a disability pension harmed the claimant's
human dignity and found Mr. Granovsky was "more fortunate" than permanently
45. The Granovsky decision is important for its progressive interpretation of disability, which is
discussed below.
46. While a number of writers have commented in general on the problems of using a comparator
group approach in equality rights analysis, we point out that the comparator group exercise
poses particular concerns for persons with disabilities. Because there is an infinite range and
multiple subgroups of disabilities, the use of comparators as a means to assess the differential
treatment runs the risk of pitting one disadvantaged group of persons with disabilities against
the another, without a proper evaluation of the overarching systemic discrimination.
47. Granovsky v. Canada, supra note 5 at para. 81.
48. Ibid. at para. 58.
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disabled claimants. 49 The Court required that Mr. Granovsky show that the greater
allowance made for the less fortunate, permanently disabled claimant caused Mr.
Granovsky to be marginalized or stigmatized. The Court held that Mr. Granovsky
failed to demonstrate that the financial deprivation derogated from his "essential
human dignity" by fostering a view that persons with temporary disabilities are "less
capable or less worthy of recognition or value as human beings".50 The Court con-
cluded that, since Mr. Granovsky was unable to show that the CPP program cast doubt
on his worthiness as a human being, he had failed to demonstrate "a convincing human
rights dimension to his complaint'"
51
How Granovsky Advances Disability Rights
It is important to recognize that the Granovsky decision promotes disability rights in
one major respect. The decision is significant for its progressive definition and inter-
pretation of disability. Relying on the reasoning first advanced by the Supreme Court
in the Mercier case, 52 Justice Binnie, for the unanimous Court in Granovsky, recognized
that "disability" may be temporary or permanent and can constitute any combination
of impairments, functional limitations, or socially constructed handicaps. 53 Adopting
the Mercier approach of distinguishing the various facets of disability, the Granovsky
decision demarcates three separate dimensions of disability: physical or mental im-
pairment (first aspect), which may or may not give rise to functional limitations
(second aspect), and the socially constructed handicap (third aspect).
54
49. Ibid. at para. 79.
50. Ibid. at para. 58.
51. Ibid. at para. 70.
52. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montral (City),
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 [Mercier]. We have commented elsewhere that Mercier is an important case
for disability rights jurisprudence because in that decision the Supreme Court explained that
disability must be interpreted to include a subjective component to the disability, or in other
words what one perceives to be the disabling condition, since disability discrimination can be
based as much on myths and stereotyping, as it is on actual functional limitations. See E.
Chadha, "The Social Phenomenon of Handicapping" in Adding Feminism to Law: The Contribu-
tions ofJustice Claire L'Heureux-Dubg (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) 209.
53. In Granovsky, supra note 5, the Court's analysis refers to the manner of differentiating among
the distinct aspects of disabilities found in the World Health Organization, International Classifi-
cation of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps: A Manual of Classification Relating to the
Consequence of Disease (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1980); restated in: United Nations
Decade of Disabled Persons, 1983-1992: World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Per-
sons (New York: United Nations, 1983) at 2-3. The International Classification distinguishes
between "impairment" as an abnormality of physiological structure or functioning, "disability"
as a limitation to activity considered normal that results from impairment, and "handicap," the
negative social consequences that result. There is also a 1997 classification scheme that refers to
impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions to convey the same ideas. See
World Health Organization International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handi-
caps (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1997).
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The Granovsky decision suggests that in disability discrimination cases the judiciary
should concentrate on this third aspect - the socially constructed handicap. The Court
reasoned that the foremost consideration in disability claims is society's response to
the disability, accompanied by careful scrutiny of whether this response pays too much
or too little attention to functional limitations:
What s. 15 of the Charter can do, and it is a role of immense importance, is address
the way in which the state responds to people with disabilities. Section 15(1) ensures
that governments may not, intentionally or through a failure of appropriate accom-
modation, stigmatize the underlying physical or mental impairment, or attribute
functional limitations to the individual that the underlying physical or mental im-
pairment does not entail, or fail to recognize the added burdens which persons with
disabilities may encounter in achieving self-fulfillment in a world relentlessly ori-
ented to the able-bodied.
55
Although Justice Binnie enunciates a socio-political model of disability by suggesting
that the proper focus for the section 15 analysis in disability claims is the state's
response to the disability rather than the disability itself, the Court's ultimate stance
towards Mr. Granovsky's dilemma appears to merely pay lip service to this theory. The
Court fails to recognize that the economic model of disability, born of a distributive,
capitalist philosophy, underpins the eligibility criteria of the CPP program. A review
of the "essential human dignity" analysis employed by the Court in the Granovsky
decision reveals that judicial interpretation of the CPP program is premised on
able-bodied norms and stereotypical notions of persons with disabilities.
Human Dignity and Economic Integrity in Granovsky
We argue that the human dignity analysis of the Granovsky decision is particularly
suspect and distressing because the Supreme Court's reasons function by stereotype.
In Granovsky, we see the Court moving in the worrisome direction of excluding
financial security for persons with disabilities from the concept of human dignity.
Imported into the Court's human dignity analysis is the "only the severely disabled
are the truly needy" stereotype implicit in the economic model of disability. The strong
influence of this negative stereotype is apparent in the case through the Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of the objectives of the CPP program. In finding Mr.
Granovsky undeserving of relief, the Court relies heavily upon the rationale that the
CPP is a self-funded, contributory scheme. In so doing, the Supreme Court appears
to simply apply the adage that "one reaps the fruits of one's own labour" to the CPP
program, without placing the onset of Mr. Granovsky's disability in the context of his
work history and his years of contributions to the plan.
54. For example, where a person is deaf, the auditory system anomaly would be the physical impair-
ment, while lack of hearing or hearing loss would be the functional limitation. An example of a
socially constructed handicap would be the failure of the medical system to provide sign lan-
guage interpretation to facilitate communication with a deaf patient.
55. Granovsky v. Canada, supra note 5 at para. 33.
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Had the Court given due consideration to the fact that Mr. Granovsky regularly paid
into the CPP program prior to being injured and the resultant disability, the Court
would have readily discerned the discriminatory, adverse effects of the "recency of
contributions" calculations on persons with temporary or degenerative disabilities.
The Supreme Court failed to fully scrutinize how the CPP "dropout" exemptions
operated in conjunction with the contributions formula to adversely affect and
exclude persons with temporary disabilities, and instead merely invoked the severely
disabled claimant as the more deserving of pension entitlement. The fact that the
Court strictly applies the recency test, and thereby permits the adverse effects discrimi-
nation experienced by persons with degenerative disabilities to go unchallenged, is
particularly troubling, given the dictum of the Court in Eldridge, where Justice La Forest,
on behalf of the unanimous Court, recognized that "[a] dverse effects discrimination
is especially relevant in the case of disability."
56
The Granovsky decision is grounded primarily in the economic model of disability
where the Supreme Court articulates a narrow equality right for persons with disabili-
ties that dissociates financial security from human dignity. The influence of the
"essential human dignity" standard compels the Court to consider whether the human
dignity involved in being denied a disability pension is, in the Court's opinion,
"essential" enough to be violated. Unfortunately, contrary to Mr. Granovsky's claim,
the Court does not agree that Mr. Granovsky's dignity was sufficiently violated.
Nowhere in the analysis are the claimant's actual feelings on the subject given signifi-
cant, if any, weight. The Court's conclusion that the mere deprivation of a financial
benefit will not engage the human dignity of a person with a disability appears
engendered from a privileged perspective and further appears oblivious to the harsh
reality of poverty and isolation that is often part of living with a disability.
Clearly missing from the Court's section 15 analysis is recognition of one of the most
oppressive forms of discrimination as experienced by persons with disabilities: eco-
nomic inequality. As previously noted, the Eldridge decision highlighted the fact that
persons with disabilities have been and continue to be routinely excluded from
mainstream educational, economic, and cultural opportunities, and persons with
disabilities are among the poorest and most marginalized in Canadian society. It is a
well-recognized and unfortunate fact that many working-age persons with disabilities
in Canada lack the education to participate fully in today's economy. 57 Moreover, as
is the case with their poor educational status, persons with disabilities have signifi-
cantly less success in finding and keeping work. 58 Recent statistics confirm the dispro-
portionately disadvantaged economic status of persons with disabilities in Canada: in
56. Supra note 17, at para. 64.





2001, 80% of women with disabilities and 63% of men with disabilities reported
income of less than $30,000. The average annual income of working-age persons with
disabilities was just $21,545, meaning that working-age adults with disabilities are
twice as likely as their able-bodied counterparts to subsist close to or at the poverty
level. 59 The Court's strict adherence in Granovsky to the recency formula is especially
disconcerting when considering that research shows that persons with disabilities
often have more difficulty maintaining stable employment than the non-disabled
population. Working-age adults with disabilities are half as likely to maintain full-year
employment as their non-disabled peers.60 Notwithstanding the fact that these link-
ages between disability, unstable attachment to employment, and poverty are well
established globally,61 the Court in Granovsky failed to consider or acknowledge
economic inequality of persons with disabilities as a human rights issue.
Furthermore, the analysis of "essential" human dignity as developed in the Granovsky
case divorces financial security from human dignity, in particular, for persons with
cyclical, recurrent, or degenerative disabilities. This troublesome feature of the Gra-
novsky decision can be gleaned from an examination of the case from the perspective
of someone living with an episodic or progressive disability. The Court reinforces the
economic model of disability where it implicitly penalizes Mr. Granovsky for not
fitting the stereotypical mould of either the able-bodied or severely disabled claimant.
Effectively, the Court regards Mr. Granovsky as culpable for not being able to overcome
his temporary disability and improve his economic status by increasing his participa-
tion in the workforce. The Court failed to recognize the fundamental reality that many
persons with disabilities, i.e. persons with mental health disabilities or persons living
with certain degenerative diseases, are rarely continuously disabled, often have periods
of ability and disability, and consequently may have sporadic or limited work histories.
59. Figures taken from A Profile of Disability in Canada 2001, online: Statistics Canada, <http://
www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/89-577-XIE/index.htm>. In a 2001 report titled A Profile of Dis-
ability in Canada, Human Resources Development Canada notes that "PALS demonstrates the
income challenges faced by all persons with disabilities, but especially by those of working-age
and families of children with disabilities." For example, working-age adults with disabilities are
more likely to live in households with an income below Statistics Canada's low income cut-off
(27.9% compared to non-disabled at 12.7%), and approximately 26% of working-age persons
with disabilities remain unemployed, see Statistics Canada, Education, Employment and Income
of Adults with and without Disabilities - Tables (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003) 40.
60. Supra note 56 at 38.
61. In "The Politics of Disability Rights Movement" (2001) 8:3 New Politics, Ravi Malhotra states,
"Disabled people today remain among the most marginal of citizens in the United Sates, as well
as in other leading Western industrialized countries. By every statistical measure known to
sociologist, whether it is poverty levels, unemployment rates or levels of education, disabled
people score very poorly. Even after years of a boom economy, disabled people remain dispro-
portionately unemployed and impoverished." Available online: <http://www.wpunj.edu/-new-
pol/issue3 1/malhot3 1.htm>.
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It is difficult to navigate the Granovsky case when one views it through a mental health
lens, and similar pitfalls are apparent when considering relapsing and remitting
conditions. According to the section 15 analysis in Granovsky, persons with psychiatric
disabilities or degenerative diseases, who may be in and out of the workforce because
of the variable nature of their condition, can be "legitimately" denied CPP benefits.
Since the shifting or erratic character of these conditions does not satisfy the "severe
and permanent" type of disability the CPP targets for aid through its "dropout"
exemptions, the inability of a claimant to qualify for a pension becomes a seemingly
"personal" problem, rather than institutionalized adverse effects discrimination. Not-
withstanding the fact that such claimants may have made a lifetime of intermittent
payments into the program, the differential treatment accorded to such "temporary"
conditions does not amount to discrimination because these claimants are not dis-
abled enough to merit the charity of the program. This interpretation, which is implicit
in the Court's reasons, underscores the vulnerability and disadvantage experienced by
persons with disabilities who do not fit the stereotype of severe and profoundly
disabled - the only category of disabled people deemed by the economic model as
deserving access to state assistance.
The Court's decision not only makes it difficult for persons with temporary, episodic,
or progressive disabilities to qualify for CPP, but also clearly poses a systemic barrier
for all persons with disabilities to advance Charter equality claims in general.62 Now,
based on the reasoning in Granovsky, the fact that a person with a disability is a member
of a historically disadvantaged group and has experienced differential treatment
because of the disability is not sufficient to establish a section 15 claim. The claimant
must also demonstrate injury to his or her "essential human dignity" other than a
financial deprivation. Consequently, according to this legal paradigm, the financial
integrity of certain communities of persons with disabilities is not worthy of protec-
tion because poverty and dependency are normative in the economic model of
disability, and state assistance is reserved for those persons who are truly needy
because, borrowing a phrase from Granovsky, of their "greater disabilities".63
The centrality of the economic model of disability in the Granovsky decision clearly
does not allow for an understanding of human dignity that includes economic integ-
rity for persons with disabilities. The Granovsky case tells us that that we have serious
worries if our involvement in the labour force is not seen as sufficiently committed,
or our health condition does not merit the charity reserved for those who are perceived
as severely and profoundly disabled. While recent jurisprudence appears to signal a
growing respect for the differences of disability, the Granovsky decision unfortunately
perpetuates a social characterization of disability premised on liberal economic ide-
ology. The judicial treatment of disability discrimination cases from an implicit
starting point of marketplace competition, efficiency, and productivity creates an
62. Supra note 36.
63. Granovsky v. Canada, supra note 5 at para. 81.
Case Commentary
"acceptable" standard of poverty for persons with disabilities. As discussed below, this
approach to the economic interests of persons with disabilities was modified in theory,
but not so much in reality, in the recent Martin decision.
THE MARTIN DECISION
In October 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada released a unanimous decision in the
case of Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation Board v. Martin and Laseur [Martin].64 The
Martin decision is only the second disability rights case to be decided by the Supreme
Court since the introduction of the Law methodology.
Summary of Martin
65
The Martin case involved a section 15 Charter challenge to workers' compensation
legislation in Nova Scotia. Although injured during the course of their employment
and assessed as having valid compensation claims, Donald Martin and Ruth Laseur
were both denied workers' compensation benefits upon being diagnosed with chronic
pain disability arising from their work-related injuries. Mr. Martin's temporary bene-
fits were discontinued within months of his injury. Ms. Laseur, after receiving tempo-
rary benefits for her work-related accident, was denied permanent partial disability
benefits and vocational rehabilitation assistance. Both claimants appealed the denial
of benefits on the ground that the Worker's Compensation Act [Act] and accompanying
regulations violated section 15(1) of the Charter. They claimed that their right to
equality was infringed because the Nova Scotia workers' compensation legislation
discriminated against workers disabled by chronic pain by arbitrarily restricting or
unfairly denying benefits for chronic pain disability.
The impugned provisions excluded chronic pain disability from the regular benefit
compensation scheme. Instead of receiving benefits normally available to injured
workers, workers diagnosed with chronic pain were (depending on date of injury)
either cut off entirely from benefits or received limited benefits. For those injured
workers who did receive compensation for chronic pain, they were required to par-
ticipate in a four-week rehabilitation program, and their benefits were capped at one
year beyond which no further benefits or treatment were available. The Workers'
Compensation Appeals Tribunal found this scheme breached section 15 of the Charter
and was not saved by section 1. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal allowed the Workers'
Compensation Board's appeal, finding that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to
apply the Charter. However, regardless of jurisdictional issues, the Court of Appeal
went on to dispose of the section 15 challenge and held that there was no equality
rights violation as the chronic pain provisions did not demean the human dignity of
the claimants. The injured workers appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.
64. Martin, supra note 6, authored by Justice Gonthier for the Court.
65. ARCH represented the Ontario Network of Injured Workers Groups as Interveners before the
Supreme Court in the Martin case.
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With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeal, holding that the Appeals Tribunal was empowered to interpret the Charter
since the empowering legislation had expressly conferred on the tribunal the authority
to decide questions of law in exercising its duties. 66 The Court then proceeded to
consider the section 15 claim of discrimination. In applying the Law methodology, the
Supreme Court in Martin found that the first and second branches of the test were
easily met. The Court noted that the Act created a separate regime for the claimant
group: injured workers disabled by chronic pain. The Court then identified this as a
formal legislative distinction made between the claimants and the comparator group
(that is, the group of workers subject to the Act who do not have chronic pain and are
eligible for compensation for their employment-related injuries). The Supreme Court
held that the differential treatment accorded to claimants disabled by chronic pain and
other injured workers was based on the section 15 enumerated ground of physical
disability.
Under the third branch of the Law inquiry, the Supreme Court noted that the
impugned Nova Scotia workers' compensation law funnelled workers with chronic
pain into a "one-size-fits-all" four-week rehabilitation program and provided, in lieu
of regular benefits, temporary benefits capped at one year. The Supreme Court
concluded that, in doing so, the Nova Scotia scheme lumped all injured workers with
chronic pain into one category that treated such workers as temporarily disabled
without considering their individual situation, their symptoms, their needs, or their
capacities. The Court found that workers with chronic pain were denied permanent
disability benefits, vocational rehabilitation, medical aid, re-employment, and accom-
modation. In reaching its conclusion that this generalized treatment of injured work-
ers with chronic pain was discriminatory, the Supreme Court affirmed the notion that
persons with disabilities must be treated, as much as possible, on an individualized
basis.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, concluding that the
exclusion of benefits for chronic pain from the general compensation scheme violated
the equality rights of workers disabled by chronic pain, contrary to section 15, and the
infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter. In finding that the
impugned provisions could not be upheld as reasonable and demonstrably justified
under section 1, Justice Gonthier observed that the Nova Scotia workers' compensa-
tion scheme pre-emptively deemed all chronic pain claims to be fraudulent and made
"no effort whatsoever to determine who is genuinely unable to work and who is
abusing the system." 67 The Court suspended its declaration of invalidity for six
66. The Supreme Court decision in Martin is also very important because it clarified when adminis-
trative tribunals are empowered to interpret and apply the Charter. That part of the decision is
ground breaking in that the Court overrules Cooper v. Canada [ 1996] 3 S.C.R. 854. The jurisdic-
tional issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
67. Martin, supra note 6, para. 112.
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months to give the Nova Scotia government time to come up with an appropriate
legislative response.
How Martin Advances Disability Rights
In many ways, the Martin decision represents important progress for advancing the
rights of persons with disabilities. In fact, the Supreme Court's application of the first
two branches of the Law test reinforced several key points that disability rights
advocates have maintained as necessary for moving Charter analysis in the proper
direction to enhance the equality rights of persons with disabilities. For instance, the
Court in Martin reinforced the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada
that a comparison group can be made up of other individuals within that same
enumerated population.6 8 In other words, there can still be a finding that workers
disabled by chronic pain have been discriminated against on the basis of physical
disability as compared to other persons with different disabilities. The Court flatly
rejected the counter argument made by the Workers' Compensation Board that
differential treatment within the benefits scheme was not based on physical disability,
because all workers under that scheme are disabled. The Supreme Court confirmed its
earlier decisions that "differential treatment can occur on the basis of an enumerated
ground despite the fact that not all persons belonging to the relevant group are equally
mistreated." 69
In clarifying this branch of the Law test, the Court also emphasized the importance of
a flexible approach to the analysis of distinctions drawn among various disabilities -
more so than other enumerated grounds of discrimination - for one simple reason:
persons with disabilities are not a homogenous group with identical characteristics
and needs. Rather, their characteristics are infinitely varied and their needs are divergent.
More clearly than ever before, the Supreme Court pronounced that the section 15
Charter right to equality for persons with disabilities must recognize the varying needs
of persons with disabilities and the right to be accommodated on an individualized
basis. In recognizing that the fundamental duty of accommodation operated on an
individualized basis, even in the context of a large-scale benefits-granting program
like a provincial workers' compensation regime, the Court commented:
Due sensitivity to these differences is the key to achieving substantive equality for
persons with disabilities. In many cases, drawing a single line between disabled
persons and others is all but meaningless, as no single accommodation or adapta-
tion can serve the needs of all.... The question, in each case, will not be whether the
state has excluded all disabled persons or failed to respond to their needs in a
general sense, but rather whether it has been sufficiently responsive to the needs and
circumstances of each person with a disability [emphasis added]. 70
68. For an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Canada according protection for subgroups, see
Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566.
69. Martin, supra note 6 at para. 76.
70. Ibid. at para. 81.
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The Court stressed that an individualized approach to disability is mandated by the
Charter guarantee of equality. The Court explained that the purpose of the section 15
equality right for persons with disabilities is the imperative to recognize the needs,
capacities, and circumstances of persons with disabilities in a vast range of social
contexts. The Court noted that to secure the equal participation of persons with
disabilities in society requires altering the social dynamic in many different ways,
depending on the abilities of the person. The Court persuasively described this
obligation in this interesting scenario: "If a government building is not accessible to
persons using wheelchairs, it will be no answer to a claim of discrimination to point
out a TTY (teletypewriter) telephone for the hearing impaired has been installed in
the lobby."
71
Furthermore, in dismissing the Board's argument that workers with chronic pain were
not discriminated against because they were no more stigmatized than other injured
workers, the Court reinforced the principle that the claimant does not have to prove
a more severe disadvantage relative to the comparator group. In order to prevent such
a "race to the bottom," 72 the Court stated:
[W]hile a finding of relative disadvantage may in certain cases be helpful to the
claimant, the absence of relative disadvantage should in my view be seen as neutral
when, as is the case here, the claimants belong to a larger group - disabled persons -
who have experienced historical disadvantage and stereotypes. 73
Indeed, the Court emphasized that the "relative disadvantage" inquiry is largely
inappropriate in disability cases where at the heart of the section 15 claim is the great
lack of correspondence between the differential treatment to which the claimants are
subject and their actual needs, capacities and circumstances. The Court explained:
It can be no answer to a charge of discrimination on that basis to allege that the
particular disability at issue is not subject to particular historical disadvantage and
stereotypes beyond those visited upon other disabled persons.
74
Last, and once again seen favourably by disability advocates, the Supreme Court in
Martin endorsed the view that government "should be wary of putting too low a value"
on protecting equality rights and accommodating disability.
75
71. Ibid.
72. This phrase was used by the Supreme Court in Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, where it
was recognized that the inquiry into whether an individual or group alleging discrimination has
experienced pre-existing prejudice is not "a race to the bottom".
73. Ibid. at para. 88.
74. Ibid. at para. 89.
75. We borrow this phrase from an earlier disability rights decision of the Supreme Court, British
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights),
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 at para. 41, wherein the Court recognized it is all too easy to cite increased
cost as a reason for refusing accommodation.
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Human Dignity and Economic Integrity in Martin
Notwithstanding the positive aspects of the Martin decision, the Supreme Court did
not steer away from the problematic third prong of the Law test. The Court returned
to the principle that some distinctions are allowed, for reasons of practicality and
efficiency, and that a distinction will infringe section 15 of the Charter only when it is
seen to violate the "essential human dignity" of the individuals affected. In fact, the
Court, commenting on the importance of this third leg of the inquiry, stated "the
distinction drawn in this case, like many other disability-based distinctions, will stand
to survive or fail the s.15(l) analysis at this stage." 76 As was the case in Granovsky,
despite the claimant's own perception and apprehension of the harm, it remains the
Court's opinion that prevails in deciding what constitutes an offence to "essential
human dignity" Then, based on the Court's assessment of the enormity of the injury,
a "distinction" may or may not be transformed into "discrimination" at this stage in
the Law methodology.
According to the Supreme Court in Martin, "essential human dignity" is to be deter-
mined by analyzing whether "a reasonable and dispassionate person, fully apprised of
all the circumstances and possessed of similar attributes to the claimant, would
conclude that his or her essential dignity had been adversely affected by the law." 77 In
sanctioning this malleable standard, the Court once again expects that the judiciary
will be able to place themselves in the mind and heart of a reasonable and dispassionate
person with a disability so as to determine whether the harm to the claimant's essential
human dignity was of such a magnitude as to constitute a Charter violation. We argue
that this exercise is not only controversial but may also pose real difficulties for a
predominantly able-bodied, privileged judiciary. At the very least, this presents a
significant risk of the judiciary importing prejudicial notions of dependency and
charity prevalent in mainstream society, resulting in a finding that the dignity interests
involved in a case were not "essential" enough or that there was insufficient harm of
the requisite degree to offend the claimant's human dignity. The term "essential
human dignity" is repeated throughout the third stage of the section 15 analysis in
Martin, reinforcing the importance of this troublesome value judgement.
In performing the "essential human dignity" evaluation in Martin, the Supreme Court
still seems to need to find that chronic pain may manifest into a "permanent and
debilitating" condition before reliance on long-term income-replacement benefits is
acceptable. Like the Court in Granovsky, the Martin judgment describes the disabled
individual as more or less "fortunate", depending on the perceived degree of disability.
In considering the lack of responsiveness of the challenged legislation to the needs and
circumstances of workers with chronic pain, the Court's concern is with those indi-
viduals who develop permanent impairments and are left with no source of income.
According to the Court, this "cannot be consistent with the purpose of the Act or with
76. Martin, supra note 6 at para. 83.
77. Ibid. at para. 85.
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the essential human dignity of these workers."78 In comparison, when speaking about
those "chronic pain sufferers" who are "fortunate" enough to be only partially inca-
pacitated, the Court shifts the focus of its inquiry on how the Act does not sufficiently
encourage their return to work.79 In other words, for those who are only partially
disabled, their essential human dignity is affected when they do not receive sufficient
accommodation or vocational rehabilitation, not when they do not receive adequate
income supports. It appears that for the more fortunate, partially disabled claimant,
something more than an economic detriment must be present to cause a constitution-
ally unlawful harm to human dignity. While it is laudable that the Court does not treat
persons disabled by chronic pain as one homogenous group, its conclusions perpetu-
ate the pernicious stereotype, embedded in the economic model of disability, that to
be allowed to seek state assistance for financial security, one must fall within the less
fortunate category of the severely and profoundly disabled.
Most relevant to the issue of economic integrity for persons with disabilities are Justice
Gonthier's comments in Martin regarding the status of economic interests under
section 15.80 To appreciate the significance of these comments, it is important to note
that at the lower court level, in discussing the contextual factor of "the nature of the
interests affected" under the third branch of the Law inquiry, the Court of Appeal in
Martin concluded that the disadvantage suffered by workers with chronic pain was
economic and therefore relatively minor. Similar to Granovsky, the Court of Appeal in
Martin espoused the view that deprivation of a financial benefit itself was not enough
to prove discrimination. At the Supreme Court, the Nova Scotia government, relying
on these reasons from the Court of Appeal and the Granovsky precedent, argued that
(1) the disadvantage suffered by the injured workers was solely economic in nature
and therefore not protected by section 15 of the Charter, and (2) the deprivation of
compensation benefits was relatively minor issue that did not constitute a violation of
human dignity. Fortunately, writing for an unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Gonth-
ier expressly rejected these arguments.
With respect to whether section 15 protects economic interests, Justice Gonthier
remarked, "[l]t was important to clarify right from the start what the status of
economic interests is in the substantive discrimination context."81 Justice Gonthier
expressly noted that there is no presumption that section 15 does not protect against
78. Ibid. at para. 97.
79. Ibid. at para. 98. It is regrettable that the Court used the identifier "chronic pain sufferers".
Disability activists offer a critique of when this type of language is used in jurisprudence to
portray disability, for example, persons with certain types of disability, i.e. persons living with
multiple sclerosis, may prefer not to be labelled as "sufferers" or described as "suffering from"
because this suggests they are victimized by their condition.
80. Martin, supra note 6 at para. 103, wherein Justice Gonthier noted that it cannot be said that the
loss of financial benefits is a trivial matter, particularly given that there was no other source of
financial support for the permanently disabled claimants.
81. Martin, supra note 6 at para. 103.
Case Commentary
economic disadvantage. Until now there has been significant debate as to whether or
not the Charter protects against financial deprivation. This was a contentious issue in
the Gosselin82 case, where the applicants strenuously argued that the Charter's section
7 "right to life, liberty and security of the person" mandated an affirmative duty on
the state to provide for an adequate level of social assistance. However, the majority
of the Supreme Court in Gosselin held that the facts of the case did not warrant a novel
application of section 7 as forming the basis for a positive state obligation to guarantee
an adequate standard of living.
8 3
In Martin, Justice Gonthier considered the question of economic interests under the
third branch in the section 15 guidelines. Justice Gonthier held that "while a s. 15(1)
claim relating to an economic interest should generally be accompanied by an expla-
nation as to how the dignity of the person is engaged, claimants need not rebut a
presumption that economic disadvantage is unrelated to human dignity."84 Thus, in
Martin, the Supreme Court "clarified" the status of economic interest in the substan-
tive discrimination context by acknowledging that, in certain circumstances, economic
deprivation may lead to loss in dignity. As the high-water mark for championing
respect for the economic integrity of persons with disabilities, Justice Gonthier noted
that economic deprivation may be "symptomatic of widely-held negative attitudes
towards the claimants and thus reinforce the assault on their dignity."8 5 For many in
the disability community, these remarks constitute a critical first step towards legal
recognition of the profound importance of economic integrity for persons with
disabilities.
Unfortunately, however, the Court was careful not to say that the financial disadvan-
tage is related to essential human dignity, and when applied to the facts of the case, the
Court simply concluded that the loss of financial benefits was not "trivial".8 6 The Court
went on to find, "more importantly" that the interests affected in the case were not
"purely, or even primarily, economic'"8 7 Beyond being denied financial benefits,
82. Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429. The Gosselin case involved a section 7
and section 15 Charter challenge to social assistance legislation in Quebec, which made the
quantum of benefits dependent upon the age of the recipient and conditional upon the partici-
pation in an employability program (persons under the age of 30 received one third of benefits
payable to persons over age 30 if they did not participate in a work program).
83. Ibid at para. 83. Although leaving the door open for the possibility that a positive state obligation
for citizen support may be made out on other facts, Chief Justice McLachlin, on behalf of the
majority, held that the social assistance scheme did not infringe the Charter. Justice Arbour, in
her strong dissenting opinion, found positive obligations to address poverty clearly within the
wording of section 7 of the Charter. For a comprehensive analysis of the Gosselin decision, see G.
Brodsky, "Gosselin v. Quebec: Autonomy with a Vengeance" (2001) 15:1 C.J.W.L. 149.
84. Supra note 6 at para. 103.
85. Ibid. at para. 103.
86. Ibid. at para. 104.
87. Ibid.
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injured workers were deprived of vocational, medical, and accommodation benefits,
which the Court found would clearly assist them in preserving and improving their
dignity by returning them to work when possible. The Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized the crucial importance of work and employment as a feature of "essential
human dignity" under section 15 of the Charter. Indeed, the Court in Martin reaf-
firmed this sentiment by citing the words of Justice Bastarache from Lavoie that "work
is a fundamental aspect of a person's life'" 88 Unfortunately, economic security is not
accorded the same status by the Court as the ability to work. Thus, even though the
Court in Martin found that financial disadvantage may be associated with the concept
of human dignity, given its statement of the importance of work to "essential human
dignity", it seems unlikely that any case based solely on economic disadvantage will
succeed in the near future.
In conclusion, while the overall thrust of the Martin decision is encouraging insofar
as it upholds the right to equal treatment for all disabled workers, we see that, within
the Supreme Court, there remains lingering judicial doubt about a conception of
human dignity that includes economic integrity, and a further unconcealed cautious-
ness about the validity of economic interests under section 15 of the Charter.
CONCLUSION
A study of the specific language chosen by the Supreme Court in the Law decision
reveals that it was not by accident that the revised section 15 test narrows the concept
of human dignity. The Law decision reiterates at a number of junctures that the
purpose of section 15 is to prevent the violation of "essential human dignity". The
Supreme Court, in making these references to "essential human dignity", appears to
delineate between degrees of human dignity as it pertains to equality rights. The Court
expressly draws a distinction between a disadvantage arising from mere differential
treatment and disadvantage from discriminatory treatment, holding that only the
latter is sufficient to trigger Charter protection. The Supreme Court seems to suggest
that what demeans a person's human dignity can be objectively evaluated and that
certain facets of human dignity can be calibrated as essential. The question we should
all ask is: What dimensions of human dignity are worthy to be characterized as
"essential", and what is unworthy as non-essential to engage the concept of human
dignity? We should pose another query: Are those in a position of economic privilege
suited to determine what financial disadvantage or deprivation is so unfair as to
amount to an indignity that is contrary to the Charter?
While the Court contends that the goal of the new section 15 methodology is to foster
substantive equality, the Granovsky and Martin judgments suggest that the "essential
human dignity" component of the new test gives the judiciary expansive discretion in
determining what types of disadvantage qualify as discrimination. Clearly, it is no
longer enough that a claimant is a member of a protected group, perceives discrimi-
88. Ibid., citing Lavoie v. Canada [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769.
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nation, and can demonstrate differential treatment based on the enumerated ground.
The claimant must now prove that the impugned government activity or legislation
has a grave, deleterious effect on the individual's "essential" human dignity. In other
words, it is no longer enough to be treated differently or less favourably; the claimant
must now show that he or she has been demeaned and degraded, as if unfair treatment
because of disability is not sufficiently insulting.8 9 This "essential human dignity"
formulation of section 15 clearly poses a more stringent test for claimants to demon-
strate harm and in doing so, enunciates an arguably more privileged and subjective
version of human dignity. As section 15 jurisprudence currently stands a lifetime of
financial deprivation meted out as a result of disability may not be a blow to dignity
sufficient to constitute an infringement of the Charter's equality guarantee.
Although the new Law methodology purportedly requires the judiciary to assess
discrimination from the outlook of the claimant, we see in the Granovsky judgment
that the Supreme Court is comfortable in concluding that something it believes to be
a minimal disadvantage, contrary to the claimant's perspective, cannot demean the
claimant's "essential human dignity" and therefore does not amount to an infringe-
ment of section 15. In Granovsky, the Court implicitly relies on an economic model of
disability where it finds that those temporarily disabled claimants, who are excluded
from the CPP program, either didn't work hard enough or weren't disabled enough,
and as such the differential and adverse treatment dispensed by the scheme did not
diminish these claimants' human dignity. The Court in Granovsky overlooks the reality
that a long-term, uninterrupted work history is often the privilege of the able-bodied,
and that generally in Canadian society persons with disabilities suffer financial hard-
ship and live at subsistence levels as a result of precarious employment status. By
ignoring such systemic inequality, the Court deems it acceptable to separate human
dignity from economic well-being for persons with disabilities.
In Martin, the Supreme Court made significant progress in holding that there is no
presumption that a section 15 claimant needs to show something more than an
economic detriment, to call into question the constitutional validity of a law or
government program. Despite taking this important step towards recognizing that
economic deprivation may engage human dignity and protection under section 15,
the Court in Martin was still not prepared to find that an impugned governmental law
or practice that jeopardizes the financial security of persons with disabilities should
always be considered to invoke equality concerns regarding the status of persons with
disabilities in Canadian society. In Martin, the Court again perpetuates the paradigm
of the "deserving disabled", first applied in Granovsky, where only the severely and
profoundly disabled are worthy of financial support, and thereby further entrenches
the economic model of disability in equality rights jurisprudence. When looking
beyond the Supreme Court's "essential human dignity" test to the core of the decisions
in Granovsky and Martin, while paying due regard to the positive aspects of those cases
89. A. Sabharwal, supra note 34.
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for persons with disabilities, what is ultimately revealed is the Court's reluctance to
hold the state accountable for laws or policies that discriminate in the provision of
financial assistance, even when directly linked to the protected ground of disability.
In conclusion, what is most objectionable about the "essential human dignity" test is
the impoverished interpretation of human dignity as it pertains to persons with
disabilities. As legal advocates, we must vigilantly draw the Court's attention to how
the economic model of disability underlies our public programs and how insidious
this theory is in reinforcing social inequalities. The challenge remains for the judiciary
to dispel the myth that persons with disabilities must be seriously and permanently
disabled, living in tragic, awful circumstances, in order to be entitled to section 15
protection. For the right to equality to be meaningful for persons with disabilities,
section 15 of the Charter must be interpreted as protecting the economic integrity of
all persons with disabilities. The time has come to recognize that economic integrity,
and the human rights values of inclusion and independence that are promoted by such
recognition, are profoundly related to the dignity and self-respect of persons with
disabilities. Human rights advocates can no longer remain complacent when courts
minimize the fundamental equality interests that flow from financial security and lie
at the heart of section 15 protection for persons with disabilities. We must start by
reminding the judiciary of the social and economic inequality experienced by persons
with disabilities and the fact that this systemic inequality goes to the very heart of
human dignity, as was poignantly acknowledged by Supreme Court in its earlier
Eldridge decision. This reminder must then be translated by the judiciary into a
commitment to identify and reject the pervasive economic stereotypes of poverty,
dependency, and charity that constrain persons with disabilities from participating in
society as equal and valued members.
